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Cloud computing is interesting from the economic, operational and even energy consumption perspectives but it still raises concerns regarding
the security, privacy, governance and compliance of the data and software services offered through it. However, the task of verifying security
properties in services running on cloud is not trivial. We notice the provision and security of a cloud service is sensitive. Because of the
potential interference between the features and behavior of all the inter-dependent services in all layers of the cloud stack (as well as dynamic
changes in them). Besides current cloud models do not include support for trust-focused communication between layers. We present a
mechanism to implement cloud service certification process based on the usage of Trusted Computing technology, by means of its Trusted
Computing Platform (TPM) implementation of its architecture. Among many security security features it is a tamper proof resistance built in
device and provides a root of trust to affix our certification mechanism. We present as a security pattern the approach for service certification
based on the use TPM.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing has been developed with two main targets; reducing IT costs and providing agile services to
both users and organizations. The foundations of cloud settle in moving data away from desktops and laptops
into large data centers. This fact potentially provides an increasing of innovation in limited devices in the form of
innovative methods of business performance. We claim that before cloud computing is completely consolidated it
is necessary to face some security issues favored cloud nature.
Although security in clouds have improved in recent years, current cloud computing implementations present
security challenges still open. Among others, we highlight client’s data are available to third party, which implies
extra care while storing our important data on the cloud[Security 2016]. Other challenges are derived from poor
portability facility provided by the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) derived in locked clients with one specific CSP &
depend upon them for all kind of services [Albugmi et al. 2016]. And insecure or incomplete client’s data deletion,
some data from cloud then it is possible that data may not be deleted because of duplicate data may exist on the
cloud [Albugmi et al. 2016]. We conclude that level of security in commercial clouds can be improved, in particular
at client side.
We defend that open security challenges are still open since traditional security solutions are difficult to apply
in current cloud implementations. Indeed most of them only can be used under barely restricted conditions.
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There may be a possibility existing that information belonging to different customers resides on the same data
server since different users are sharing a cloud provider platform. This implies that information leakage may
arise unintentionally when information for one customer is given to another customer. Prior cloud computing
access control mechanisms were based on the assumption that only information from a customer resided on the
same data server under own customer’s control. However, this assumption is not applicable now. In many cases,
security solutions applied in traditional computing are not enough to provide security in cloud computing since
new breaches and threats appears within this paradigm. Many research initiatives have faced different aspects of
security in these domains, but some of them were unsuccessful since they were based on implementing traditional
solutions straightly to the cloud. This fact implies that only partial solutions are applied in some cases, then a
necessity of security approaches tailored for cloud computing for particular issues raises. Moreover, hackers are
spending substantial time and effort looking for ways to find vulnerabilities in the cloud infrastructure that would
allow them to penetrate the cloud [Liu et al. 2012].
Certification provides a mechanism to support assurance and compliance, but its adoption to cloud service
certification is not as straightforward. Certification has been represented for human beings and not supported
for automated processing of certified objects. Besides it is limited to static cases. Current certification schemes
do not provide dynamic verification of a system at runtime. We claim this interesting feature as essential for
dynamic and unpredictable scenario as we found services running in clouds. There are approaches that have
addressed the first problem by using computer oriented formats, processes and tools to support the automated
validation of certification and selection of services based on their certificates. Nevertheless the second is an open
problem, at least there is not a satisfactory solution. The approach presented gives an approach for dynamic
system verification at runtime using TPM [Group 2005] as a security pattern. TPM stands for Trusted Platform
Module, TPM was conceived by a computer industry consortium called Trusted Computing Group (TCG) and is an
international standard for a secure cryptoprocessor, a dedicated microcontroller designed to secure hardware
through integrated cryptographic keys.
As it was previously pointed out, this paper presents an approach built on a combination of software certification
and hardware based certification techniques [Muñoz and Maña 2014]. The cornerstone in our model is Trusted
Computing technology, we take advantage of its functionalities as secure element. TPM becomes the anchor of
our certification chain. Consequently, bringing the gap existing between the software certification and the means
for hardware certification becomes as a target. Since the secure systems based on Trusted Computing tends to
be hard to implement in real scenarios, we present a security pattern [Gallego-Nicasio et al. ; Schumacher et al.
2005].
We propose an approach that provides means to establish integrity (authenticity) of evidence, and subsequently
verify if the captor integrity holds (can be trusted). Whenever possible, evidence gathering is build upon existing
standards and practices (e.g., interaction protocols, representation schemes etc.) regarding the provision of
information for the assurance of security in clouds. A particular implementation is built using Trusted Computing
(TC) technology supporting evidence communication.
We claim the necessity of a binding mechanism as a foundation for service certification as we pointed out. In
our binding approach, each service is pledged to operate with a key pair maintaining linked to a pledge. This
mechanism implies that service providers can be made legally responsible for using the key pair (only with
the pledge service). From security perspective, we define this as one of the strongest points of our approach.
Considering key pair resides in TPM and it is bound to pledged configuration of the service. When the service is
called, TPM attestation is triggered to measure complete service configuration. This sets up key as available to
the service, and allowing to attest the integrity of the underlying platform (infrastructure, VM, OS, and every layer
involved). Thus, when service status changes a new measurement is taken (new the platform state checking).
This will not successfully complete and the key will not be available to preserve the integrity and non repudiation.
Every service request is then signed using service private key. To enable to have different configurations, each
group of services that share infrastructure is executed in a different virtual machine, this provides isolation.
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The pattern presented in this paper gives functionality for the generation of hybrid certificates based on the
combination of different types of evidences (including testing and monitoring data, and trusted computing platform
proofs). It leads to cover security properties to an unprecedented extent and increase the overall confidence in the
use of cloud services.
2. A SECURITY PATTERN FOR CLOUD SERVICE CERTIFICATION MODEL USING TPM
2.1 Intent
—A recurrent problem in cloud environments the certification of services.
—Certification is considered a robust mechanism for many security problems.
—Human interaction is required in any certification process that makes unpractical for services in cloud.
—Despite of current certification mechanisms require human interaction at any moment in the whole process.
2.2 Context:
Current cloud environments propose an interesting alternative to migrate corporate data with many functionalities
and evident efficiency improvements, and even security offered by cloud providers is enough it can be considerably
improved. Certification provides a mechanism to support assurance and compliance, but its adoption to cloud
service certification is not as straightforward. Certification has been represented for human beings and not
supported for automated processing of certified objects and limited to static cases. In terms of efficiency this
requirement makes inapplicable in most of cases.
2.3 Problem description:
Current certification schemes do not provide dynamic verification of system status at runtime. In these terms our
approach should gather the following forces:
—A certification stack that defines the process of engineering and developing systems (services and applications)
is needed.
—Certification approach that includes analyzed software to certify, identifies and specify runtime proofs to generate
the certificate is required.
—It is needed the pledge generation process that authorize the certificate and generate pledge.
—The process that defines how to use pledge by the clients should be included.
2.4 Solution:
Certification stack is shown in figure 1. This defines the process of engineering and developing systems (services
and applications). This process includes some elements as security aspects (not only traditional based on
functional aspects) and certificates to establish trust relationships. This security pattern provides an alternative to
service certification in clouds to traditional mechanisms where human interaction is required. Different colors in
figure 1 for stack match with boxes in figure 2 where an improved certification process is described. In this line,
Analyse Software green boxes are conducted at Application level from figure 1 stack in green color, so on and so
forth.
2.4.1 Structure:. Figure 3 shows the class diagram for a certification and proof binding use case. CA inspects
a particular service (Analyse Software from figure 2) and extracts particular properties (Identify Runtime Proofs
from figure 2). Proof specifications are produced using TPM functionalities. Pledges bind certified properties to
services and proof specifications (Generating certificate from figure 2). This process adds testing configuration as
relevant information for secure services.
Certification Authority (CA) is the entity that conducts the inspection of a service to be certified. CA includes
required properties as part of the Pledge. A Pledge is a complement to the certificate that using semantics together
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Fig. 1. Certification Stack Fig. 2. Certification Process
are used to implement service binding. Pledges can then be used to certify properties inspected by CA and
maintain bound to the service. Henceforth, TPM (stands for Trusted Computing Plaftorm) can be used to attest a
particular Testing Configuration (instantiation of service and TPM information).
2.4.2 Dynamics:. Figure 4 describes a sequence diagram for one of our use cases, this shows aspects from
binding use case initiates by Cloud Provider not included to simplify the figure. The sequence should be started by
service provider, who pretends initiates the certification of his services in cloud infrastructure (Infrastructure As A
Service). CA inspect the service instance together with available properties to update pledge content. CA is to
Fig. 3. Cloud Certification Class Diagram
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Fig. 4. Cloud Certification Sequence Diagram
fill the pledge structure, checking and matching properties and service inspection feedback. TPM resources are
used to take measures of service current state. Public key, migratable key and signature are generated using TPM
functionalities and included in the pledge.
2.5 Implementation:
Our approach can be defined as an orchestration of different technologies within a mediation layer. Among these,
we highlight the role of Trusted computing (TC) technology. TC is essential to attest both the hardware and the
native OS. Also TC attests software certificates used for higher leveled applications and services. Our design
relies on the sealed bind key functionality provided by trusted computing technology.
Assurance of cloud services allows service consumers and providers to ascertain that the service properties
provided in the certificates guarantee continuous compliance with their own requirements. This enhanced mecha-
nism increases the confidence of both consumers and providers that their required level of assurance is being
kept, before becoming involved in service design, deployment, and access on cloud.
An overview of the workflow is following described as; a sealed bind key is used to encrypt part of the code of
the service. This mechanism enables that it can be only used when platform state is preserved unchanged. We
conducted the design of our approach considering restrictions, but it provides a high level of security allowing to
establish a limited execution environment. In spite of limitations, which should hinder its integration in real world
scenarios, but a tailored approach based on this scheme can be suitable for particular cases. We propose after a
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previous study of the case. We propose relaxing initial restricted conditions, which enables achieving valuable
secure levels. Besides a relaxed version could be adapted for cases with lower security requirements with positive
prediction outcomes.
We have included of two use cases descriptions to a better understanding how our pattern works; pledge
generation (where the certificate authorization is involved ) and binding use cases. We introduce our pledge concept
as a semantic description for certifying services. This is composed by two well differentiated parts, the standalone
and SAML container. The pledge standalone representation and SAML container specific representation. Resuming
use cases, the first step is service evaluation, which includes CA checking. This inspects a list of properties that
must be fulfilled and inspecting the service. This triggers that CA fills pledge form with feedback information sent.
Binding platform implies the creation of a key pair (using a sealed key as seed), this sealed key is bind to the state
of the platform preserving platform integrity.
The TPM infrastructure is used to supply a foundation where all cloud certification chains of trust can be
grounded, adding a major trusted capabilities to certification location attestation. TPM based certificates provide
services the possibilities to show proofs, including a variety of strong authentication and data security mechanisms,
demonstrating compliance with numerous regulations.
Certification models should also provide means to combine several evidences in an integrated framework,
establishing the foundations for the definition of hybrid and incremental certificates. We highlight the incremental
certification as particularly important features. When the evidence from a certificate is enough to verify the security
property related to it (as determined by the certification model). The a certificate is issued as an instance of this
type. Novelty of this approach is that even after certificate is issued, it can be updated subject to changes in the
operational conditions of the platform. As systems are being composed not only based on functional aspects,
but also on security aspects (properties, threats, risks, etc.), trust is established by means of certificates. Also
components of a system may change without the knowledge or control of other components.
Certification stack shown in figure 1 proposes the novelty of an engineering. New systems are composed not
only based on functional aspects, but also on security aspects (properties,threats, risks,etc). A key element is
used to establish trust relationships, that is, certificate that enables that components of a system may change
without the knowledge or control of other components. TPM provides secure storage and key pair resides in
TPM; and is bound to the pledged configuration of the service. When the service is called, the TPM attestation
functionality is used to attest the (complete) service configuration, this has been applied in different scenarios
i.e. mobile agents [Muñoz and Maña 2011; Muñoz et al. 2010]. At this execution point, key sets are available to
the service. If service changes TPM functionality is used to attest the state, then the checking fails and we can
assume that the key will not be available anymore. Every response to a service call is signed using service private
key. We consider that it is important to provide the capability of grouping services in terms of functionality. For this
purpose, each group of services (sharing infrastructure) is executed in a virtual machine. This approach implies
some restrictions, among them the hardest one is TPM equipped hardware (or even virtualized [Berger et al. ]).
2.6 Example Resolved:
We provide an approach for the certification of services running on cloud. Figure 1 shows our certification model
stack combines Trusted Computing Proofs with software certificates. As a bridge to the gap between both elements
we included a new concept, that is pledge. As we show in figure 2 this enhanced service certification mechanism
includes two essential steps before the certificate generation actually takes place. Runtime proofs have to be
identified and related proofs properly specified.
2.7 Consequences:
This pattern provides the following advantages:
—A certification approach for services in cloud computing.
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—Identification and specification at runtime of proofs and certificate generation.
—Hardware proofs combined with software certificate to conduct a comprehensive process.
—A binding mechanism to combine proofs and certificate within pledge concept.
—Mechanisms for analyzing software (service) to certify.
Liabilities include:
—Hardware requirements restrict the usage of this patterns, such as a TPM embedded is needed.
—Pledge issuing and management entail additional steps that makes certification more complex.
2.8 Known Uses:
We pretended to achieve an approach that includes a certification stack that defines the process of engineering
and developing systems. Figure 1 shows that certification stack vs the infrastructure stack of a service. Figure 2
depicts our certification approach including steps as analysis of software to certify, identification and specification
at runtime of proofs and certificate generation. Pledge are issued authorizing the certificate, a complete description
of pledge definition is not needed to understand how our patterns works and is out of the scope of this paper.
Likewise, the pledge usage process by the clients is out of the boundaries of this paper and currently is ongoing
work.
Some authors define that to accept our approach as a pattern, we should find at least three examples of its
use in real systems. However, there are some exceptions to this rule when the approach is clearly generic, as
our pattern obviously is. This model faces the problem of certification of services in cloud avoiding the human
inspection in every step. Generic nature of our approach makes easy to include real examples in which a direct
implementation of our pattern can take place.
2.9 Related Patterns
—Some patterns related to provide security for cloud environments as the misuse patterns for cloud comput-
ing [Hashizume et al. 2011].
—Cloud Resource Access Control pattern [Erl et al. 2015] is related to the pattern proposed in this paper.
3. CONCLUSIONS & ONGOING WORK
This paper proposed a pattern that provides a approach for service certification in cloud computing using a
trusted hardware module. The proposed scheme can successfully bridge the gap between Trusted Computing
and Software Certification by combining the best of both worlds and overcoming their respective limitations. The
concept of pledge as a computer oriented form of certification is an essential key for improving the flexibility and
practical applicability of TC mechanisms. Besides opening possibilities to explore future applications for Trusted
Computing technology.
We propose a discussion of a generic life cycle model including a variety of possible updates with other
key changes throughout life cycle of incremental certificates. Ongoing work includes the description of trusted
computing technology as a security pattern itself as a complement to the approach presented throughout this
paper and the composition of both patterns as an unified solution.
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